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I. INTRODUCTION
This article comprises a follow-up to the 2008 publication of
Brownfield Development in Connecticut: Overcoming the Legal and
Financial Obstacles, co-authored by Barry J. Trilling and Sharon
Siegel. That article sought to answer questions about "whether and how
Connecticut and the federal government will provide financial support
and liability relief to stimulate brownfield development." 2 That article
covered developments in the law through 2007. Among other things, the
article summarized the liability scheme governing contaminated real
estate in Connecticut and, in particular, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)3
and Connecticut statutes intended to address to what extent "innocent
landowners" are liable for clean-up costs and impacts of contamination
on third parties.4 Since 2007, and up until the legislative session ending
* Barry J. Trilling chairs the Environmental Practice and the Climate Change and
Sustainable Development group at Wiggin and Dana LLP. He is a graduate of UCLA and of
Boalt Hall, the law school at the University of California, Berkeley, and is admitted to practice
in Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia,
and California.
** Anika Singh Lemar is an Associate in the Real Estate, Environmental and Energy
department at Wiggin and Dana LLP. She received her J.D. from New York University
School of Law and her B.A. from Yale University.
1. Barry J. Trilling & Sharon R. Siegel, Brownfield Development in Connecticut:
Overcoming the Legal and Financial Obstacles, 26 QUNNIPIAC L. REv. 919 (2008).
2. Id. at 921.
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2006)).
4. See generally Trilling & Siegel, supra note 1.
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in June 2011, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted few bills
dealing with both the financing of and liability attendant to brownfield
remediation and development.' With the exception of the Abandoned
Brownfields Cleanup ("ABC") program enacted in 2009,6 discussed in
more detail below,' no significant legislative changes had been made to
ease the liability of prospective purchasers of contaminated properties
either by the Connecticut General Assembly or the United States
Congress.
Nonetheless, the issue of liability for purchasers of brownfield
properties has remained central to the ability for those sites to be cleaned
up and redeveloped. Owners and developers of contaminated properties
face, in addition to clean-up costs, potential liability to individuals
harmed by waste and contamination and to Connecticut state and the
federal government under statutory schemes intended to curb pollution.
Under Connecticut law, even a purchaser with no knowledge of prior
contamination can be held responsible for remediation costs incurred by
the state or a third party.9 Developers consider the risk of future liability
to third parties to be a significant cost factor when considering whether
to undertake a brownfield remediation project. In one study, real estate
developers indicated that, when considering whether to undertake a
brownfield redevelopment project, "protection from third-party liability
for environmental damage claims from site occupants, workers, and
neighbors" had a value of almost $1 million, while "cleanup liability
5. See, e.g., An Act Concerning Brownfields Development Projects, 2009 Conn. Pub.
Acts No. 09-235, §§ 7, 11; An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation Liability, 2010 Conn.
Pub. Acts 10-135, §§ 2, 6.
6. An Act Concerning Brownfields Development Projects, 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts No.
09-235, § 7 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-911 (West 2011)).
7. See infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
8. As noted by Lavea Brachman, Executive Director of "Greater Ohio" and a Non-
Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution:
Contrary to general public misperceptions, the primary obstacle to brownfield
redevelopment today is not environmental contamination per se, even though the
prior use and associated environmental conditions of these properties distinguish
them from other underutilized properties. The primary obstacle to redevelopment
remains the threat of liability that by statute arises from acts that cause or contribute
to contamination and/or to those with an ownership interest in the property.
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Faculty Profile: Lavea Brachman, LAND LINES, Oct. 2002,
at 14, available at https://www.lincolninst.edupubs/dl/543 543 october02.pdf. Ms.
Brachman, chief architect in Ohio of the Brookings/Greater Ohio "Restoring Prosperity to
Ohio Initiative," is the co-author of the Brookings Institution publication, Restoring
Prosperity: Transforming Ohio's Communities for the Next Economy.
9. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-451, 22a-452, 22a-452d (West 2011); see also
Trilling and Siegel, supra note 1, at 923.
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protection" (i.e., insurance against changes in regulations that would
require additional remediation at a later date) was worth over
$700,000.0 As the authors note, it is unlikely that the private sector will
step in to provide the level of security sought by developers:
The enviromnental insurance industry, for example, can provide a range of
products that address cleanup and third-party liability. However, the 100
percent liability protection . . . that developers valued so highly is not available
in the market-it unrealistically would require assurance that the insurer would
accept every claim and would never impose an upper limit on the payoff-and
other insurance remains unaffordable or unavailable for small sites."
Accordingly, if remediation and repurposing of contaminated sites is a
public policy objective, some liability relief provided by the government
will further that goal.
States across the country offer a variety of incentives, including
cash assistance, tax relief, regulatory relief, public investments in
infrastructure, and liability relief, in an attempt to encourage
redevelopment and reuse of contaminated properties. With the passage
of An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an
Economic Driver (or "Brownfield Economic Driver Act"), signed into
law by Governor Dannel Malloy on July 8, 2011,12 Connecticut has
moved into the vanguard of states with programs designed to mitigate
the liability for property purchasers,13 which served as a primary
disincentive to the remediation and redevelopment of these properties.
The new legislation will supplement and eventually supplant the
current patchwork of programs that address brownfields, including the
voluntary cleanup program,14 the covenant-not-to-sue program,15 and
provisions of the Connecticut Property Transfer Act, 16 with regard to
10. Kris Wernstedt et al., Attracting Private Investment to Contaminated Properties:
The Value ofPublic Interventions, 25 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 347, 358 (2006).
11. Id. at 363.
12. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141.
13. For a comprehensive listing of state voluntary remediation programs, see U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS: AN
UPDATE FROM THE STATES (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/statetriball
update201 I/bf states report 201 1.pdf [hereinafter VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS]; see
also BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED
PROPERTY (Todd S. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2002).
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-133x-133y (West 2011).
15. Id. §§22-133aa-133b.
16. Id. §§ 22-134-134d.
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properties remediated under the new legislation.17 Most notably, Section
17. See generally Trilling and Siegel, supra note 1, at 931-60. According to the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (predecessor to the Department of
Energy and Environmental Protection), fifteen different laws govern remediation of
contamination in Connecticut, each with its own set of objectives and responsibilities which
may overlap those of another law, CONN. DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF CONNECTICUT'S SITE CLEANUP PROGRAMS (Jan. 2011),
available at http://www.ct.gov/dep/lib/dep/site cleanup/remediation roundtable/compre
hensivecleanup baseline_paper.pdf (also referred to as the Comprehensive Evaluation
Whitepaper); see also CONN. OFFICE OF LEGIS. RESEARCH 2011-R-0240, BROWNFIELD
PROGRAMS (2011), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/rpt/2011-R-0240.htm
(summarizing Connecticut state programs that deal with brownfields). The table below
appears in the Comprehensive Evaluation Whitepaper describing each of those laws:
Authority Statutory Reference Date
Pollution or discharge of waste prohibition Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-427 1967
Commissioner's authority to issue an order to
require person to correct potential source of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-432 1967
pollution
Commissioner's authority to issue Orders to a Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 22a- 1967landowner, or municipality 433, 428, respectively
Release Reporting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-450 1969
Release Response Conn. Gen. Stat. §22a-451 1969
Commissioner's authority to respond to and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a- 1969
mitigate spills and releases 449(a)
PCB program Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-463- 1976469a
Potable Water Program -DEP authorized to
provide short-term water to residents/schools if
they are served by a contaminated private well, to
investigate for the source of such contamination, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-471 1982
and to issue orders to either the responsible party
(or if such party not known, to municipality) to
supply safe drinking water
Commissioner's authority to issue order to abate Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a- 1982
pollution 430(d)
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-
Underground Storage Tanks 449(d)-(h), RCSA 22a- 1983
449d-106
Property Transfer Act - If and when certain
properties defined as "establishments" are Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-134 1985
transferred, they must be investigated by a party to
the transfer and then remediated
State Superfund Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-133e 1987
Voluntary Remediation Programs Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 22a- 1995
133x-13 3 y
Significant Environmental Hazard Notification Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-6u 1998
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42
U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.; "RCRA") Corrective Action RCSA 22a-449(c)-105(h) 2002
regulations
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17 of the Brownfield Economic Driver Act extends liability protection to
the purchasers of contaminated property who did not cause, exacerbate
or contribute to the property's contamination and to the parties from
whom they purchased the brownfield property.18  This Article (i)
examines the new Section 17 liability protection program, administered
jointly by the Department of Economic and Community Development
(DECD) and the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
(DEEP); (ii) reviews the Section 9 expansion of the existing ABC
program; and (iii) briefly notes various other provisions that will affect
municipalities and property owners. In Section II, this Article explains
how Section 17 of the Brownfield Economic Driver Act will work. In
Section 1II, we consider revisions to the ABC Program and compare that
program to Section 17. In Section IV, we consider whether the Act will
effectively address liability concerns that hamper brownfield
redevelopment and propose tweaks to the Act that may further
encourage remediation and redevelopment projects in Connecticut.
II. BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION AND REVITALIZATION PROGRAM
Section 17 of the Brownfield Economic Driver Act establishes a
program protecting parties who investigate and remediate brownfields
from liability to the state and third parties.1 9  Parties eligible to
participate in the program include bona fide prospective purchasers
(BFPPs), innocent land owners, and contiguous property owners who
did not themselves contaminate the property.20 Provided these parties
otherwise meet the program criteria, properties that are already under
investigation pursuant to an existing brownfield program (e.g., the state
voluntary cleanup programs 21 and the covenant-not-to-sue programs 22)
may also participate in the Section 17 program.23 A property currently
18. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17. This form of liability protection follows
closely the "bona fide prospective purchasers" provision in the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Liability, and Compensation Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607(r)(1) (2006), but extends the protection further to the seller of a
property if the purchaser completes its remedial obligations under the program.
19. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17.
20. Id § 17(b).
21. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-133x-133y (West 2011).
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-133aa-133bb (West 2011).
23. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
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the subject of an enforcement action by DEEP or the United States
Environmental Protection Agency is not eligible for inclusion in the
program.2 4 Properties that either would be subject to the terms of the
Transfer Act or which are already undergoing characterization and
remediation under the Transfer Act, however, are not excluded from
participation. Also, upon subsequent conveyance, properties remediated
under the program are exempt from the filing requirements of the
Transfer Act. 2 5  This allows the owner to avoid the cost, time,
obligations, and uncertainty associated with a future Transfer Act
filing.2 6
The Section 17 program is open to people, businesses, nonprofit
organizations, municipalities, public and private municipal economic
development agencies, and state agencies.27 Parties wishing to
participate in the program make application to DECD which, using
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(e)(1).
24. Id. § 17(b). This section excludes from eligibility any property:
[Clurrently the subject of an enforcement action, including any consent order
issued by the Department of Environmental Protection or the United States
Environmental Protection Agency under any current Department of Environmental
Protection or Environmental Protection Agency program, listed on the national
priorities list, listed on the State of Connecticut Superfund Priority List, or subject
to corrective action as may be required by RCRA [the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2006)].
As enacted, the list of exclusions does not include properties listed in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS)
database which thus appear eligible unless otherwise excluded. Id.
25. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(o). The question may arise at some point
whether a party who has been accepted into the program, and whose property may avoid
future Transfer Act liability, could sometime in the future be ruled to have been ineligible to
participate by virtue of a later review of its status as a Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser at the
time it applied for admission to the program. In Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS
Nitrogen, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina ruled that a purchaser
of a contaminated property who claimed protection from liability under CERCLA as a BFPP
lost that protection by not following recommendations for subsequent investigation by its
environmental consultant and because its relationship with the property's seller as its
indemnitor, in connection with which it urged the state environmental agency not to prosecute
the former owner for its environmental releases. 746 F.Supp. 2d 692 (D. S.C. 2010). But see
3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co., No. CV 08-3985 PA, 2010 WL 5464296,
at *11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2010) (rejecting a contention that the current property owner failed
to take reasonable steps to stop any continuing release or to prevent any threatened releases of
hazardous substances at the subject property). A finding, even after completion of
remediation, that a Section 17 participant was not a proper BFPP could arguably result in loss
of its liability protections.
26. See discussion infra at note 63.
27. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. I1-141, § 17(a)(13).
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certain state-wide "portfolio criteria" intended to assure that the program
extends to a wide geographic and demographic range of sites, may admit
up to thirty-two applicants per year to the program.28 Applicants
accepted to the program receive liability protections immediately upon
acceptance. 2 9 Those protections continue after remediation of the site. 30
Particularly important are the protections against liability afforded to the
BFPP for properties remediated under the program, which extend as well
to the party from whom the BFPP acquired the brownfield, even if that
31party does not meet the eligibility requirements of the program.
Significantly, however, although the BFPP does not have to address off-
site contamination, the prior owner will retain liability for any such
migration off-site. 32 Further, program participants will remain liable for
contaminating the property or contributing to pre-existing
contamination.33 After DECD selects which applicants may enter the
program, administration shifts to DEEP, which will monitor and may
34
audit the remediation of properties in the program.
A participant must clean up the property to meet DEEP standards
by using a Licensed Environmental Professional (LEP);3 5 within 180
days after DECD has approved the program application, the participant
must submit a brownfield investigation plan and remediation schedule
that is signed and stamped by the LEP.36 The plan and schedule must
28. Id. § 17(b)-(c).
29. Id. § 17(j), (k)(1)(B), (n)(1).
30. Id. § 17(n)(t)-(2).
31. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(n)(6).
32. Id. In Wisconsin, the Voluntary Party Liability Exemption law allows Certificates
of Completion (COC) to be issued for sites where there is contamination on a property that
has migrated from off-site, if the voluntary party is exempt from liability under the off-site
exemption. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 292.13-292.15 (West 2011). In New York, the innocent
purchaser also need not chase contamination off-site. The concept is built into the definition
of a "volunteer" who is only responsible for remediating the site while "participants" have the
responsibility to remediate the off-site contamination. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 27-
1405(l)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2011).
33. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(j), (n)(1).
34. Id. at § 17(h). As such, the Section 17 Program is not self-executing such as in
Pennsylvania, where a party seeking to obtain relief from liability for many, if not most,
cleanups may do so without first applying to a state agency to participate in any program. See
infra note 129.
35. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133v (West 2011). Massachusetts delegates similar
functions to Licensed Site Professionals (LSPs), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21A, § 19 (West
2011), as does New Jersey to Licensed Site Remediation Professionals (LSRPs). N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 58: 1OC-7 (West 2011).
36. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
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include a timeframe for notifying specified parties and the public before
the remediation begins.3 ' The public has thirty days from the last notice
provided by the participant to comment on the proposed remediation.
Section 17 implicitly requires the participant to respond to the public
comments by allowing the participant to start cleaning up the property
only after it submits those comments and its responses to the DEEP
Commissioner.
Applicants must pay a fee equal to five percent of the brownfield's
assessed value as of the municipality's most recently completed "grand
list" (of taxable properties in the municipality),4 0 to be paid in two equal
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(k).
37. Id. § 17(k)(2).
38. Id. § 17(k)(4).
39. Id. A 1990s United States Government Accounting Office survey disclosed that
half of the state brownfield and voluntary remediation programs studied at that time did not
include opportunities for public participation. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GOA/RCED-97-66, SUPERFUND: STATE VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO
ENCOURAGE CLEANUPS 43-45 (1997) [hereinafter GAO Report]. The public participation
element of Section 17 recognizes the importance of integrating input from the communities
where the site remediation and redevelopment will take place. As noted in the GAO Report,
this is an element that has received insufficient attention in many state brownfield and
voluntary remediation programs. GAO Report, at 43-45. As one academic commenter has
noted even more recently, "Byzantine regulatory processes rarely facilitate public
participation by politically marginalized communities." Jonathan H. Adler, Reforming our
Wasteful Hazardous Waste Policy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 724, 744 (2008); see also Michael
P. Healy, The Sustainable Development Principle in United States Environmental Law, 2
GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL L. 19, 36 (2011) ("State voluntary cleanup programs . . .do
not require much input from the local communities that would be affected by the cleanup and
redevelopment of the property."). However, in a 2007 article titled, Legislative Update: State
Brownfields Law, Melissa A. Orein and Ellie B. Word state:
All states have public record or notice requirements for their voluntary cleanup
programs . .. [such as ] publication in the state registrar or in newspapers and the
posting of signs on the property. Thirty-eight states require public comment
periods to allow citizens to voice concerns about proposed developments. Over
half the states even require hearings or meetings for Brownfield redevelopment,
giving local residents a chance to interact and collaborate with developers and local
officials.
Melissa A. Orein & Ellie B. Word, Legislative Update: State Brownflelds Law, 27 CONSTR.
L. 38, 39 (2007) (citations omitted). The mandatory public participation process of Section 17
falls within those state programs that favor public access and contribution, is straightforward,
and should be "user friendly."
40. The "grand list" is published annually by each Connecticut municipality pursuant to
section 12-55 of the Connecticut General Statutes. According to the statute:
Each such grand list shall contain the assessed values of all property in the town,
reflecting the statutory exemption or exemptions to which each property or property
owner is entitled, and including, where applicable, any assessment penalty added in
accordance with section 12-41 or 12-57a for the assessment year commencing on
the October first immediately preceding.
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installments. 4 1 The participant must pay the first installment within 180
days after the DECD Commissioner approves the application and the
second within four years after that date.42 Ameliorating this exaction,
however, Section 17 also sets conditions for reducing or eliminating the
fee.43 Thus, when a participant finishes investigating the property within
180 days after the DECD Commissioner has approved its application,
the DEEP Commissioner must reduce the first installment by ten
percent.44
Section 17 gives participants up to two years to investigate the
property, three years to commence remediation, and eight years to finish
the cleanup. 45  As an additional possible fee reduction, the DEEP
Commissioner must eliminate the second installment when a participant
cleans up the property within four years after the application's approval
46date. As a third possible fee reduction, when a participant voluntarily
investigates contamination that migrated from the property, the DEEP
Commissioner must reduce the installment or give the participant a
refund "in an amount equal to twice the reasonable costs of such
investigation" of off-site contamination, up to the installment amount.47
A subsequent party that acquires a property in the program must pay a
$10,000 transfer fee to obtain the program's protections. 48 As a final
amelioration, Section 17 exempts municipalities and municipal
economic development agencies from paying this fee when any of them
acquire property in the program, but it requires such an entity to collect
and remit the fee to DEEP if the entity later transfers the property to
another party.49
Following completion of the remediation, the LEP must submit a
final remedial action report to both the Commissioners of DECD and
DEEP.50  The report must include verification by the LEP that the
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-55 (West 2011).
41. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(h).
42. Id.
43. See id. § 17(i)(2)-(3), (5).
44. Id. § 17(i)(1).
45. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. I1-141, § 17(k)(2).
46. Id. § 17(i)(2).
47. Id. § 17(i)(3).
48. Id. § 17(n)(3).
49. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. I1-141, § 17(i)(4).
50. Id. § 17(k)(5).
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remediation took place in accordance with Connecticut's Remediation
Standard Regulations, Sections of the Regulations of Connecticut State
Agencies (RCSA).5 ' The report is subject to approval by the DEEP
Commissioner who may, for any reason within sixty days after receipt of
the report, decide to conduct an audit of the LEP's verification or interim
verification and so notify the participant.52 The DEEP Commissioner
may also audit a remediation if he requests information from the
participant and receives no response. The DEEP Commissioner must
conduct his audit within 180 days after the participant has submitted the
remedial action report and the verification or interim verification.5 4 The
Commissioner may audit the remediation more than 180 days after
receiving the verification or interim verification, however, if the
Commissioner believes the verification was based on inaccurate,
erroneous, or misleading information, or the Commissioner determines
that post-verification monitoring and other actions have not been taken.5 5
The Commissioner may also audit the remediation after 180 days if an
environmental land use restriction was not recorded in the land records,56
5 1. Id.
52. Id § 17(k)(8)(A).
53. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. I1-141, § 17(k)(8)(B).
54. Id § 17(k)(8)(A).
55. Id. § 17(k)(8)(C)(i)-(ii). This provision should avoid the problem that arises in the
LEP audit procedure under the Transfer Act. That procedure has resulted in uncertainty that
has inhibited the sale of brownfield properties, as stated in Trilling & Siegel, supra note 1, at
949-50:
When an LEP oversees the site's remediation [under the Transfer Act], the
LEP's verification that the parties receive at the remediation's completion should
be tantamount to a DEP "no further action" letter since the LEP has delegated
authority to act on behalf of the DEP. As a practical matter, however, a certifying
party remains potentially liable until the time has elapsed for DEP to conduct an
audit of the LEP's verification. Under . . . [current law], the DEP may audit a
verification for any reason within three years after its receipt of the verification, but
may not audit a verification after three years unless there are circumstances, as set
forth in the statute, that justify the later review. The [Transfer Act] does not
provide a timeframe for completion of the audit.
. . . The Transfer Act. .. authorizes the DEP to audit a verification within three
years of its submission and possibly longer (due to a long list of exceptions), with
no mandatory time limit for completing the audit. This looming possibility of a
DEP audit discourages, to some extent, the transfer of environmentally complex
properties in Connecticut.
56. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(k)(8)(C)(iii).
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the law was violated with regard to verification,57 or the remediation
may not be preventing a substantial threat to the environment and public
health. Within fourteen days after completing the audit, the
Commissioner must send the audit findings to the participant, the LEP,
and the DECD Commissioner. In doing so, the DEEP Commissioner
may approve or disapprove the remedial action report and, if the latter,
the Commissioner must explain why.6 0 If the Commissioner rejects the
report, the participant has an opportunity to cure any deficiencies.6 ' A
decision to approve the remedial action, although not so entitled, will
amount to the Connecticut equivalent of a "No Further Action" letter
issued by other states.62 In addition, the property will no longer be
subject to the requirements of the Transfer Act.63
The liability protection provided by the statute does not preclude
the DEEP Commissioner from taking any appropriate action to require
additional remediation of the subject property where the Commissioner
has determined that (a) the participant knew or should have known that it
provided false or misleading information to the Commissioner; (b) new
information confirms previously unknown contamination; (c) the
participant fails to complete the remediation described in the schedule or
fails to comply with monitoring, maintenance, operating or
environmental land use restriction requirements; or (d) there are changes
in exposure conditions (e.g., a change from nonresidential to residential
57. Id § 17(k)(8)(C)(iv).
58. Id § 17(k)(8)(C)(v).
59. Id. § 17(k)(8)(A).
60. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(k)(8)(A).
61. Id. § 17(1).
62. Id. § 17(n)(2). See generally VOLUNTARY RESPONSE PROGRAMS, supra note 13;
DAVIS, supra note 13.
63. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(o). Removing a site from the strictures of the
Transfer Act should definitely increase its marketability. The Transfer Act's cumbersome
requirements have impeded such transactions that trigger its requirements without having
resulted in a significant record of approved final cleanups. See Trilling and Siegel, supra note
1, at 938-53. As reported by "Workgroup #1," appointed by DEEP in the Summer of 2011 to
study specific aspects of the government/private-sector relationship concerning property
remediation, "[a]lthough there are in excess of 3700 sites in the Transfer Act program (since
1986), only slightly more than 390 have been confirmed to achieve full compliance with the
RSRs. With nearly 260 new sites entering the Transfer Act program each year, the process
imbalance is evident." REPORT TO CONN. DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
EVALUATION OF CONNECTICUT'S CLEANUP PROGRAMS-CURRENT STATE 7 (2011), available




use of the property).64
The interim protections from liability that an applicant receives
upon acceptance into the program become permanent once the DEEP
Commissioner notifies the participant that DEEP will not audit the
64. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(n)(4)(A)-(D). Nearly every state brownfield
and voluntary remediation program utilizes "reopeners" that allow the government to require
additional remediation or to demand payment for additional cleanup of a site. The reopeners
in Section 17 are typical of those found throughout the nation. See, e.g., Mississippi (MISS.
CODE ANN. § 49-35-15(5) (West 2011)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 130A-
310.33(c) (West 2011)), Pennsylvania (35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6026.505 (West 2011)). In
Covenants Not to Sue issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for cases
arising under CERCLA, EPA may require additional response action from a party who has a
Covenant Not to Sue "if information is received after entry of the consent decree regarding
previously unknown site conditions or new scientific determinations, and such information
indicates there is an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or the
environment." Superfund Program; Covenants Not to Sue, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,038, 28,038 (July
27, 1987). Further, CERCLA provides that EPA may also reopen state approved cleanups on
sites with regard to which federal enforcement authority has been limited, if:
(i) the State requests that the President provide assistance in the performance of a
response action;
(ii) the Administrator determines that contamination has migrated or will migrate
across a State line, resulting in the need for further response action to protect
human health or the environment, or the President determines that contamination
has migrated or is likely to migrate onto property subject to the jurisdiction,
custody, or control of a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
and may impact the authorized purposes of the Federal property;
(iii) after taking into consideration the response activities already taken, the
Administrator determines that-
(I) a release or threatened release may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health or welfare or the environment; and
(II) additional response actions are likely to be necessary to address, prevent,
limit, or mitigate the release or threatened release; or
(iv) the Administrator, after consultation with the State, determines that
information, that on the earlier of the date on which cleanup was approved or
completed, was not known by the State, as recorded in documents prepared or
relied on in selecting or conducting the cleanup, has been discovered regarding the
contamination or conditions at a facility such that the contamination or conditions
at the facility present a threat requiring further remediation to protect public health
or welfare or the environment. Consultation with the State shall not limit the ability
of the Administrator to make this determination.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9628(b)(1)(B) (West 2011). Cf David A. Dana, State Brownfield Programs as
Laboratories of Democracy?, 14 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 86, 94-96 (2005) (arguing that reopeners
are unlikely to occur and referring to a 2003 study by Cleveland State University that only
0. 1% of completed Brownfield cleanups had been reopened as of the date of that study). See
also Robert A. Simons, et al., Quantifying Long-term Environmental Regulatory Risk for
Brownfields: Are Reopeners Really an Issue? 46 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 257, 266 (2003)
(reporting that "[lt]o date the gross incidence of reopeners ... for the programmes contacted
and participating was 12/11,497, or just over 0.1%").
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process or that the DEEP audit findings have been addressed." The
permanent liability protection for the participant and for the immediate
prior owner also begins if the Commissioner fails to act on a remedial
action report and the accompanying verifications within 180 days after
receiving them.6 6 Under both outcomes, neither the participant nor the
prior owner has liability to the state or third parties for the costs incurred
to remediate the contamination identified in the plan. 67  Nor are they
liable for the costs relating to equitable relief or damages resulting from
the contamination. The liability protections for the BFPP, innocent
land owner, and contiguous property owner also apply to historical off-
site impacts, including deposition, waste disposal, the effects on
sediments, and damage to natural resources. 69  Those protections,
however, do not extend to the prior owner.70
Completion of a remediation under Section 17 should also provide
protection from federal judicial or administrative enforcement against
the BFPP7' under Section 106(a) of CERCLA7 2 or cost recovery actions
under Section 107(a)73 by virtue of CERCLA Section 128(b). 74  That
section precludes such enforcement where "a person is conducting or has
completed a response action75 regarding the specific release that is
addressed by the response action that is in compliance with the state
program that specifically governs response actions for the protection of
public health and the environment .... ."76 Section 17 would comprise
65. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. I1-141, § 17(n)(2).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 17(n)(2), (6).
68. Id. The drafters of the liability relief provisions of § 17(n)(2) borrowed
substantially here from the liability relief provision of the Georgia Redevelopment Act. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-207(a) (West 2011) (stating that a prospective purchaser "shall not be
liable to the state or any third party for costs incurred in the remediation of, equitable relief
relating to, or damages resulting from the preexisting release" of regulated substances from
the property).
69. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(n)(2).
70. Compare id § 17(n)(6) with id § 17(n)(2).
71. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006).
73. Id. § 9607(a).
74. Id § 9628(b).
75. This language arguably precludes the seller from "riding along" on the protection
afforded to the BFPP by CERCLA Section 128(b) unless the seller has actually participated in
the conduct of the response action.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9628(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
3432012
QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW
such a state program. 7
The Section 17 program will likely include many sites that
currently meet the definition of an "establishment" under the Transfer
Act and for which the seller already occupies the position of a
"certifying party" under that legislation. For such a property, the seller's
formal obligations as the certifying party will continue, as a matter of
law, until completion of the subject property's remediation pursuant to
the Section 17 program. In practical effect, however, once the BFPP's
application has been accepted, the seller's remedial activities will be
taken over by the Section 17 participant, and it would be prudent for the
parties to recognize this practical shift in remediation responsibility in
the purchase and sale agreement for the property. The Section 17 site
investigation and cleanup obligations track those for the certifying party
in the Transfer Act (e.g., the property must be assessed within two years,
remediation must start within three years, and remediation must be
complete within eight years). Upon completion of the Section 17
remediation, the property will no longer be subject to the Transfer Act
unless a new pollution event triggers its renewed applicability to the
site.
III. SECTION 9 CHANGES TO THE ABANDONED BROWNFIELD
CLEANUP (ABC) PROGRAM
Originally enacted in 2009, the ABC program in its initial form
extended liability protection only to contaminated sites that had been
abandoned (unused or underused) after October 1, 1999.80 A
prospective property owner interested in the ABC Program's liability
protection provisions must apply to the DECD Commissioner.8 In the
77. For the Section 17 program to so qualify, the State would have to:
[M]aintain, update not less than annually and make available to the public a record
of sites . . . at which response actions have been completed in the previous year and
are planned to be addressed under the State program . . . . The public record shall
identify whether or not the site, on completion of the response action, will be
suitable for unrestricted use and, if not, shall identify the institutional controls
relied on in the remedy.
Id. § 9628(b)(1)(C).
78. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-134a(g)(1)(A), (C) (West 2011).
79. This is clearly of interest to the seller of the property who may have taken on the
obligation of a certifying party under the Transfer Act. See discussion infra at Section IV.
80. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-911(a) (West 2011) (revised by An Act Concerning
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more than two years since enactment of the ABC program, however, not
a single application has been submitted.82 Section 9 of the Brownfield
Economic Driver Act seeks to encourage ABC Program applications by
expanding the program to sites that (i) have been abandoned for at least
five years before a party seeks admission to the program or (ii) the
Commissioner of Economic and Community Development otherwise
determines are eligible. The Act also expands program eligibility to
municipalities.84
After DECD has accepted a site into the program, the participant
will not be held responsible to investigate or remediate "any pollution or
source of pollution that has emanated from the property" before the
participant took title, nor will the participant be liable to the state or any
third party for the release of any regulated substance that took place at or
from the property before it took title, provided, however, that the
participant (i) remains in the voluntary remediation program, (ii)
investigates existing pollution, and (iii) eliminates future emanation or
85
migration of pollutants from the property.
Selection of a property for the ABC program exempts the property
from the Transfer Act 8 6 and entitles the participant to a covenant not to
sue from the DEEP Commissioner without fee. The covenant not to
sue is transferable to subsequent owners. 8  An eligible applicant
designated by the ABC program is considered an innocent landowner
and is not liable to the DEEP Commissioner for preexisting site
conditions provided the person did not establish, cause, or exacerbate the
contamination, and complies with applicable reporting requirements. 89
82. STATE OF CONNECTICUT BROWNFIELD WORKING GROUP, FIRST BROWNFIELD
WORKING GROUP REPORT 12 (2011), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/201I1/CEdata/Tmy/
201 1HB-06526-R000308-Brownfield%2OWorking%2OGroup-TMY.PDF).
83. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic





87. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 9 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. §
32-911(b)).
88. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133aa(g) (West 2011); An Act Concerning
Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No.
11-141, § 11.
89. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic




The ABC Program, like Section 17, provides a pathway to liability
relief for purchasers of contaminated properties who are not responsible
for that contamination. Like Section 17, the ABC Program imposes
various eligibility criteria limiting participation in the program. And, as
is the case with the Section 17 criteria, the ABC criteria are
unfortunately nebulous. A prospective purchaser can make some
attempt to evaluate its ability to take advantage of the program because
there is no cap on the number of participants and because some of the
ABC Program criteria can be determined with certainty. A prospective
purchaser will know, for example, whether a property has been
abandoned for at least five years, a key criterion for admission to the
ABC Program. Under Section 17, on the other hand, a prospective
purchaser is less likely to know whether the DEEP Commissioner and
DECD Commissioner will determine that the property meets the
"sustainability," "readiness to proceed," "consistency," and "smart
growth" standards established in the that section's "portfolio factors." 90
The ABC Program, however, also allows the DECD Commissioner to
impose "any other criteria" she deems necessary. 91  This provision
allows the state great flexibility in meeting policy goals, but provides no
certainty to a prospective redeveloper whose primary concern is
avoiding the uncertainty associated with environmental liability. In this
sense, taking advantage of the ABC Program will require that private
parties, including municipalities, negotiate allocation of the risk that a
property will not be accepted into the program. If, however, the
property is truly abandoned, there may be no prior owner with whom to
negotiate.
Once a property is accepted into the ABC Program, it must "enter
and remain in the voluntary remediation program 92. . ., investigate
pollution on such property in accordance with prevailing standards and
guidelines and remediate pollution on such property in accordance with
regulations, . . . and ... eliminate further emanation or migration of any
pollution from such property."93 The person or municipality accepted
into the program is not responsible for investigating or remediating any
emanation from the property that occurred before it took title to the
90. Id. § 17(c).
91. See id. § 9(b)(7).
92. Established in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133x(a).
93. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 9 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. §
32-911(g)).
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property.94 In addition, effective July 1, 2011, the owner is not liable to
a third party, including the state, for a release that occurred prior to the
owner taking title unless the owner caused or contributed to the
release.95 As noted above, following acceptance into the ABC Program,
a property owner enters and remains in the voluntary remediation
program set forth at Section 22a-133x of the Connecticut General
Statutes.96 The voluntary remediation program allows a property owner
to remediate its property under the direction of a Licensed
Environmental Professional unless the DEEP Commissioner, in its
discretion, chooses to oversee the cleanup.97 The completed remediation
"may be used as the basis for submitting a Form II pursuant to sections
22a-134 to 22a-134e inclusive of [the Transfer Act]."98 Because the
DEEP Commissioner can choose to require that DEEP approve all of the
technical plans and reports related to the investigation and remediation,
the voluntary remediation program can entail an entirely separate
application process, even after a property and its owner have been
accepted into the ABC Program. Accordingly, it is imperative that a
property owner meet with DEEP and address any concerns raised by the
agency with respect to the technical aspects of the proposed remediation,
even before submitting an application to the ABC Program to DECD.
Another key difference between the ABC Program and Section 17
is that Section 17 grants liability relief to prior owners while the ABC
Program does not. The availability of seller relief may discourage
abandonment in the first instance and instead encourage owners of
contaminated properties to transfer properties to redevelopers.
IV. EVALUATING CHANGES TO CONNECTICUT'S LIABILITY
FRAMEWORK
Section 17 and the ABC Program, as amended, are significant
improvements to Connecticut's previous brownfield liability framework.
Previous legislation to protect purchasers of contaminated property
consisted of piece-meal efforts that fell well short of insulating property
redevelopers from liabilities arising from past uses of the property.
94. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 9 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. §
32-911(h)).
95. Id. § 9(o).





These statutes had overly narrow restrictions on eligibility or were
unduly cumbersome in implementation. In 2005's An Act Concerning
Third-Party Liability for Contaminated Property, for example, the
Connecticut legislature created a statutory bar to lawsuits brought by
third parties, other than the state, against innocent landowners who
remediated their property in accordance with an investigatory report
approved by the Department of Environmental Protection and for which
a Licensed Environmental Professional has prepared a final report with
regard to pollution existing prior to taking title to a property. 9 9
However, it also subjected the landowner to a penalty of $100,000 or
more if it is determined that he or she "is affiliated with the person
responsible for the pollution or source of pollution" which he or she
remediated.'00 In the following year, the Connecticut General Assembly
enacted the very generically titled An Act Concerning Brownfields,
which, among other accomplishments, (i) created the Office of
Brownfield Remediation and Development within the Department of
Environmental Protection, dedicated to studying and developing
procedures to streamline brownfield remediation, and (ii) established a
state-funded pilot program to identify brownfield remediation
opportunities in four Connecticut municipalities and to exempt the
municipal grant recipients from liability.'o The original ABC Program
was just such an incremental change to liability policy. It extended
liability protection only to sites that had been abandoned after an
arbitrary date, October 1, 1999, for which there was no viable
responsible party, and where the property had a regional or municipal
economic development benefit.10 2  Section 17 is a significant
improvement over this patchwork of liability relief provisions, all with
different entry criteria, different remediation requirements, and different
scopes of liability relief. First, Section 17 establishes a pathway to
remediation, redevelopment and liability relief that is, in theory, open to
any property in the state. Further, it encourages owners of contaminated
properties to sell to buyers who will remediate and reuse those lands.
Regrettably, notwithstanding the many advantages of Section 17 and the
ABC Program to program participants, those provisions' reliance on
agency discretion detract from their utility to developers and the towns
99. 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 05-90 (codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-133ee
(West 2011)).
100. Id. § 1(c).
101. 2006 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 06-184.
102. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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and cities that would like to see contaminated properties put to good use.
The first step in redeveloping a contaminated property is typically
conveyance to a buyer uninvolved in the original contamination.
Inherent in the sale of a contaminated property is the risk that a future
user, whether the buyer or a third party, will look to the seller for relief if
a claim related to the environmental condition of the property arises.
There are multiple examples in Connecticut case law of sellers who have
faced lawsuits where a purchaser discovers contamination that had not
been known to the sellerl0 3 or even when, before selling a property, the
seller disclosed the full scope of a property's contamination.104 Even
where the seller ultimately prevails based on the contractual allocation of
liability, the threat and uncertainty associated with future litigation can
discourage an owner of contaminated property from entertaining the
possibility of a sale. In this situation, discontinuing activities at the
property and boarding it up-effective abandonment-may make
business sense. Although preventing future reuse of the site may ensure
that the current owner who decides to do so will not face a claim for
cleanup costs or damages from a governmental entity, a future owner, or
site occupant, such claims avoidance conduct frequently results in blight,
such as that found in the Connecticut communities that have numerous
fallow brownfield sites. This conduct also strains municipal resources
suffering from lost property tax revenues that could result from cleanup,
development, and reuse of sites which are often located close to existing
infrastructure, including transportation.
Other than providing direct subsidies or tax credits that might
reduce the sting of trailing liability,'05 the greatest incentive to allow
development of brownfield properties is to provide protection against
103. See, e.g., 24 Leggett St. Ltd. P'ship v. Beacon Indus., Inc., 239 Conn. 284, 685 A.2d
305 (1996) (turning in part on a contractual indemnity from the purchaser in favor of the
seller). But see ATC P'ship v. Coats N. Am. Consol., Inc., 248 Conn. 537, 552-54, 935 A. 2d
115, 125-26 (2007) (holding that there is no common law indemnification by a seller in favor
of a purchaser of contaminated property and that a purchaser must rely on the Transfer Act,
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452(a), and contractual obligations to seek relief for damages
related to contamination from the entity or person from which it purchased the contaminated
property).
104. See, e.g., Visconti v. Pepper Partners Ltd. P'ship, 77 Conn. App. 675, 825 A.2d 210
(2003); Comm'r of Envtl. Prot. v. Sergy Co., LLC, No. X06CV084018262S, 2010 WL
1508465 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2010).
105. For example, a taxpayer who has entered into a Brownfield Cleanup Agreement
(BCA) with New York's Department of Environmental Conservation may be eligible for tax
credits relating to the cleanup and redevelopment of a brownfield site. See Brownfield




such trailing liability for owners who would otherwise pursue
detrimental claims avoidance conduct. We are not aware of any other
State program that provides direct liability protection to the seller arising
from the remedial activities of the purchaser, except to the extent that the
seller participates in the remediation.10 6  This protection for the seller
addresses concerns that subsequent purchasers will engage in more
restrictive cleanups than performed by the buyer and seek to recover
their costs of doing so against a previous owner who has no such
protection. This seller protection should remove a major disincentive for
property owners who would otherwise not place their sites on the market
and leave them "boarded up" rather than face the potential trailing
liability.
In addition, a property that completes a Section 17 remediation is
no longer subject to the strictures of the Transfer Act. Removal of the
property from the applicability of the Transfer Act will effectively (and
should, as a matter of law) dissolve any further obligation of the prior
certifying party. This is clearly of interest to the seller of the property
who may have taken on the obligation of a certifying party under the
Transfer Act. The certifying party's obligations continue as long as the
property is subject to that statute; those obligations remain with a
certifying party notwithstanding a subsequent transfer of the property by
a subsequent holder who may also become a certifying party, or the
existence of a pre-existing certifying party from a prior transaction.
This potential glut of certifying properties, all who have strict
liability obligations with regard to the property, has led to much
confusion as to who must continue a cleanup if the certifying party who
has an obligation to conduct an investigation or remediation fails or is
unable to continue to do so.o 7 For example, in Commissioner of
Environmental Protection v. Sergy Co., LLC, Sergy Company, LLC
("Sergy"), the current owner of a contaminated site, obtained the
property from Magnetek, Inc. ("Magnetek") which, in 2001, signed off
106. See, e.g., 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6026.501(a)(1) (West 2011) (containing § 501(a)(1)
of Pennsylvania's Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act ("Act 2"),
which extends liability protection to "the current or future owner of the identified property or
any other person who participated in remediation of the site").
107. See, e.g., Sergy Co., 2010 WL 1508465; see also Festival Realty, Inc. v. William
Prym, Inc., No. HHDCV085020595S, 2010 WL 3448046 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2010)
(holding that Festival's submission of a Form III and agreement to hold Prym harmless from
all liabilities, losses, costs and expenses arising out of or in connection with environmental
laws when Festival sold a contaminated property to Prym did not require Festival to resubmit
a Form III when the Prym later resold the property).
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as a certifying party under the Transfer Act.108 DEP sued both Sergy
and Magnetek.'09 In 2002, DEP informed Magnetek that it was required
to submit the proposed schedule to investigate and remediate the
property required by the Transfer Act.o10 Not only had Magnetek failed
to file this schedule, but due to a dispute arising between the parties, a
groundwater PCB treatment system for the property ceased operating,
resulting in PCB contamination."' DEP sought an order requiring
Magnetek to comply with the Transfer Act and to pay a civil penalty not
to exceed $25,000 per day pursuant to section 22a-134b of the
Connecticut General Statutes. 112 In response, Magnetek alleged that
there had been a prior certifying party from a 1986 transfer of the
property who had performed a cleanup under DEP's supervision and that
DEP should look to the 1986 certifying party to complete the
outstanding obligations of the Transfer Act remediation.' 13
In its answer to DEP's complaint, Magnetek asserted a special
defense of common-law apportionment to DEP's claim.1 4 The court
granted DEP's motion to strike Magnetek's special defense of
apportionment on the grounds that the harm giving rise to DEP's action
was Magnetek's own failure to comply with the Transfer Act, a harm
that could not be apportioned with the prior certifying party.1 5
Although the court in this matter noted that DEP's allegations of
wrongdoing involved Magnetek's own failure to submit the required
schedule to comply with Magnetek's Transfer Act duties, rather than any
failed obligation of the prior certifying party,' 16 the case implicitly
recognizes that where there has been more than one certifying party in a
chain of transfers of a single property, DEP may choose to bring an
enforcement action against any one of those certifying parties.
Although the alleviation of trailing liability concerns and the
removal of qualifying properties from the applicability of the Transfer
Act comprise significant improvement to Connecticut's liability
framework, Section 17 is not a panacea. Real estate developers,
including those who redevelop contaminated properties, do so only if the




112. Sergy Co., 2010 WL 1508465, at *1.
113. Id. at *1 -2.
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id. at *4-5.
116. Sergy Co., 2010 WL 1508465, at *4.
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projected revenues exceed the projected costs. Limiting a developer's
liability itself limits the developer's risk and uncertainty, thus reducing
unquantifiable costs. To the extent that the costs include unquantifiable
liabilities, redevelopment is at best a risky venture and, at worst, a non-
starter. Thus, to the extent that Section 17 fails to bring certainty into
the redevelopment process, it fails to further the goals of remediation
and redevelopment. By limiting the number of properties that can
participate in the program and by imposing nebulous "portfolio
factors,"" 7 Section 17 fails to provide redevelopers the certainty they
may require in order to undertake a remediation project. The ABC
Program, as described above, includes similarly opaque criteria.
The use of the portfolio criteria described above represented a
compromise between bill proponents who sought to have the Section 17
program operate on a self-implementing basis (i.e., every applicant who
certified that both the participant and the subject property met the
statutory criteria would gain entry to the program) and those who sought
to have the program be more selective, with a government agency
deciding which few applicants would enter the program each year. The
co-author of this Article, Barry Trilling, was among the authors of the
original version of Section 17 and was among those who participated in
discussions with representatives from the agencies that would administer
the program (i.e., the Department of Economic and Community
Development and the Department of Energy and Environmental
Protection, as well as representatives of the environmental activist
community). The agency representatives expressed concern that a
program with unlimited admissions would overwhelm their
administrative capacity."'8  The environmental activists expressed a
strong preference for a "pilot program" to demonstrate that the liability
reforms would not result in broad environmental degradation." 9 A
117. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(c).
118. E-mails from Eric Brown, CBIA Legislative Counsel, to Barry Trilling, David
Hurley, Elizabeth Barton, Lee Hoffman, Nancy Mendel, & Pam Elkow, ad hoc group that
drafted Section 17 of Public Act 11-141 and presented it to the State of Connecticut
Brownfield Working Group, established by section 2 of Public Act 10-135, for presentation to
the legislature (Feb. 22, 2011, 11:43 AM & 12:07 PM) (on file with the Quinnipiac Law
Review) (reporting on February 22, 2011 deliberations of the Brownfield Working Group,
particularly the comments of DEEP Robert Bell and Graham Stevens, and DECD Peter
Simmons).
119. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver: Hearing on H.B. 6526 Before the Commerce Comm., 2011 Leg. Sess. (Conn. 2011)
(statement of Roger Reynolds, Connecticut Fund for the Environment), available at
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compromise was reached in which no more than thirty-two applicants
would be accepted into the program in any one year.12 0  Although
applicants would continue to "self-certify" with regard to the eligibility
criteria (with evidence of eligibility criteria), the honing down of
applicants to thirty-two would be accomplished by DECD's reviewing
the applications for meeting the state-wide portfolio criteria. 12 1 These
criteria were designed to assure that, in addition to incentivizing
innocent purchasers to develop brownfield properties, the state may be
able to achieve certain planning and policy goals in a demographically
and geographically balanced manner. 12 2
The portfolio factors are: (1) job creation and retention; (2)
sustainability; (3) readiness to proceed; (4) geographic distribution of
projects; (5) population of the municipality where the property is
located; (6) project size; (7) project complexity; (8) length of time and
degree to which the property has been unused or underused; (9)
projected increase to the municipal grand list; (10) consistency of the
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/CEdata/Tmy/201 1HB-06526-R000308-Connecticut%20Fund
%20for%20the%2OEnvironment%20-%2ORoger%20Reynolds,%20Senior/o20Attomey-
TMY.PDF; see also E-mail from Roger Reynolds, Connecticut Fund for the Environment, to
Barry Trilling, David Hurley, Elizabeth Barton, Lee Hoffman, Nancy Mendel, Pam Elkow, &
Gary O'Connor (Mar. 16, 2011 6:22 PM) (on file with the Quinnipiac Law Review)
(expressing opposition to Section 17 and preference to its limitation as a pilot study).
120. See, e.g., E-mail from Eric Brown, CBIA Legislative Counsel, to ad hoc group (Feb.
3, 2011, 10:24 PM) (on file with the Quinnipiac Law Review) (conveying e-mail exchange
with DEEP Commissioner designate Dan Esty concerning, inter alia, limiting number of
participants in program); see also E-mail from Barry Trilling to ad hoc group (March 14,
2011, 2:29 PM) (on file with the Quinnipiac Law Review) (concerning same).
121. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(c). The wording and context of Section 17(c)
are ambiguous. We read the section to mean that, if the eligibility criteria for the applicant as
a bona fide prospective purchaser and the site as a Brownfield are met, and there are more
than thirty-two applications, DECD will then consider certain "portfolio" factors to assure a
diversity of projects throughout the state in order to winnow them down to thirty-two. One
could plausibly argue, however, that the portfolio factors apply to every application,
regardless of the number received, although doing so could result in an application and
selection process that would amount to a form of "beauty pageant," pitting applicants against
one another for the selecting agency to choose the most politically attractive project, a throw-
back to the byzantine process that Section 17 aims to supplant.
122. Letter from Catherine Smith, Connecticut Department of Community and Economic
Development Commissioner, to Trade Association Officials and Members (Sept. 28, 2011),
available at http://cbia.com/govaff/pdf/2011/smithletter.pdf; Fuss & O'Neill, Inc., Connecticut
Brownfield Remediation and Revitalization Program (Aug. 2011), http://ctmainstreet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/Brownfield-overview-Fuss-ONeill.pdf; Wiggin and Dana LLP,
Liability Relief for Purchasers of Contaminated Sites: Connecticut's New Act Concerning




property as remediated and developed with municipal or regional
planning objectives; and (11) the proposed development's support for
and furtherance of principles of smart growth or transit.123 As such, the
program arguably meets the objectives stated by some academic
commentators on state brownfield and voluntary remediation programs
that these programs ought to move "toward a development-centered
approach to brownfields, not one that caters specifically to
developers."l 24
Notwithstanding the many advantages of Section 17 to program
participants, its limitation to only thirty-two sites in any one year makes
the purchase of eligible properties less attractive because of the
speculative nature of admission to the program. Why, a prospective
purchaser may ask, should it go through the expense of qualifying for
and applying to DECD for admission when there is no guarantee that
DECD will accept its application to the program and thus no assurance
of relief from liability if it meets the program's obligations? The answer
may lie in politics: until the Section 17 program becomes entirely self-
implementing, at least with regard to acceptance into the program,
prospective purchasers and developers will devote their attention only to
those properties that are all but certain to be admitted into the program
because DECD, DEEP, or local authorities believe they are most
important to their own objectives-not necessarily the objectives of a
free market.
An interesting wrinkle in Section 17 may allow a municipality or an
economic development agency to nominate a site that comprises the
subject of an uncompleted transaction.12 5 In most instances, however,
when a party who contemplates entering the Section 17 program buys a
property, it must assume the risk that its application will not be accepted
among the thirty-two that DECD may select in any given year.
The parties to a brownfield transaction, however, may find a
contractual mechanism to overcome this barrier. For example, the
purchase and sale agreement for the site could require the seller to retain
its cleanup obligations until the purchaser is accepted into the program
with an amount placed in escrow by the buyer that reflects the projected
123. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(c).
124. Joel B. Eisen, Note, Brownfields at 20: A Critical Reevaluation, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 721, 723 (2007); see also Alexander Maro, Outsourcing the Filth: Privatizing Brownfield
Remediation in New Jersey, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 159 (2011).
125. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 17(d).
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cleanup cost. If the purchaser is then accepted into the program, the
escrow would be refunded to the buyer to cover its projected cleanup
costs. If the DECD rejects the application, the transaction might proceed
with the escrow distributed to the seller if it agrees to assume cleanup of
the site (which might be required by the Transfer Act) or the parties
could void the transaction with a return of all deposits.12 6 This will
entail a cumbersome process requiring the service of a lawyer
experienced in brownfield transactions. It is also possible that DEEP
could devise an administrative process whereby it would enter a "buyer-
seller agreement" similar in fashion to the Pennsylvania agreement
described in the note below'27 in the form of an agreement among itself,
the current owner, and a BFPP that would be subject to DECD's
approval of the BFPP's application to the Section 17 program.12 8
The Section 17 program would be more likely to draw applicants
and to meet with success if it were self-executing, such as in
Pennsylvania, where a party seeking to obtain relief from liability for
many, if not most, cleanups may do so without first applying to a state
agency to participate in any program. Rather, the Pennsylvania process
requires the party who wishes to engage upon a voluntary cleanup
126. Connecticut courts have held that the parties to a transfer of contaminated property
can contractually allocate responsibility for remediation and liability resulting from
contamination. See, e.g., Landmark Inv. Group, LLC v. Chung Family Realty P'ship, LLC,
125 Conn. App. 678, 10 A.3d 61 (2010); McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David
McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 93 Conn. App. 486, 890 A.2d 140 (2006); Brame v. Grela, No.
CV075011505S, 2009 WL 5698073 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2009).
127. Pennsylvania's "Model Buyer-Seller Agreement" comprises a three-way agreement
in the form of a Consent Order and Agreement among the buyer, the seller, and the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP), under which the seller
agrees to remediate the property in accordance with Act 2 and attain one or a combination of
the Act 2 remediation standards. Mitchell E. Burack, Pennsylvania Innocent Purchaser
Agreements for Brownfield Sites, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Apr. 1 1999), available at
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications article.aspx?ArticleKey= 108. PADEP gives the
buyer a Covenant Not to Sue at the time the agreement is signed. Id The Agreement
provides, however, that it "shall be null and void if the Buyer does not buy the Property"
within an agreed to number of days after execution of the Agreement. Id In the Connecticut
context, the seller would agree to enter one of the state's voluntary remediation programs
under CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-133x and 133y, or the Covenant Not to Sue programs of
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-133aa and 133bb if DECD should turn down the buyer's
application to the Section 17 program. As with the Pennsylvania Buyer-Seller Agreement,
this Connecticut Agreement would also be null and void if the buyer does not purchase the
property within a designated number of days.
128. Recognizing how Section 17 functions differently from Pennsylvania's self-
executing Act 2 program, the Connecticut Buyer-Seller Agreement proposed here would




resulting in liability relief that will attain a "Background" or "Statewide
Health Standard" to file with the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection (PADEP) a "notice of intent to initiate
remediation" and to submit its final report demonstrating attainment of
the standard "to the municipality in which the remediation site is located
and published in a newspaper of general circulation serving the area and
in the Pennsylvania Bulletin."' 29 Using the Site-Specific Standard
requires PADEP approval of a remediation plan before embarking on the
cleanup activity, as well as submission of a notice of intent to remediate
to PADEP and to the municipality in which the site is located, and
publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation serving
the area in which the site is located.130 These are not political decisions,
however, but technical decisions based on the likelihood of the
applicant's proposed remediation to meet its cleanup goals. Both
Section 17 and the ABC Program require application to a state agency
and permit that state agency to act in its unfettered discretion when
determining whether to admit a property into the applicable program.
V. OTHER ACT PROVISIONS
The Brownfield Economic Driver Act includes other provisions of
note to municipalities and property owners:
* It makes permanent an existing pilot program that provides
funding and liability protection to municipalities for investigating
and remediating brownfield sites, contingent on funding
availability.13 1
* It relieves certifying parties who submit a Form III or Form IV
pursuant to the Transfer Act from the requirement to investigate
or clean up contamination that occurs after the later of either
completion of a Phase II investigation or submission of the Form
III or Form IV.132
129. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 6026.302(e), 303(h) (West 2011).
130. Id. § 6026.304(1)-(m).
131. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 1 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. §
32-9cc(c)).
132. Id. § 4. As explained in the Bill Analysis prepared by the Connecticut Office of
Legislative Research concerning Section 4:
The bill exempts certifying parties under the Transfer Act from investigating and
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* It requires the DEEP Commissioner to issue a comprehensive
evaluation of all brownfield remediation programs and legislation
by December 15, 2011.133
* It broadens the definition of the term "brownfield" to include
properties where site expansion (in addition to redevelopment or
reuse) is affected by contamination.13 4  The definition will also
now include sites that require environmental investigation as well
as those requiring remediation of those sites. 1s
* It exempts projects that receive financial assistance from the state
for the purpose of investigation or remediation from the payment
of certain fees. 136
* It extended the term of the existing Brownfield Working Group,
charged with examining the remediation and development of
brownfield in Connecticut, to January 15, 2012.137 It also created
two new gubernatorial appointees on the group. 3 8
* It makes permanent the tax increment financing program
administered by the Connecticut Development Authority.139 This
remediating contamination that occurs after they remediated the property. By law,
parties to the sale or transfer of a potentially contaminated property must notify
DEP about the transaction, their knowledge about the property's condition, and the
party that will investigate, and, if necessary, remediate the property (i.e., the
certifying party). The certifying party must provide this information on DEP's
Form III. When the property is remediated, the certifying party must notify DEP to
that effect by submitting a Form IV. The bill specifies that the certifying party does
not have to investigate or clean up any real or potential contamination that occurs
after (1) data was collected at the site (i.e., completed Phase II investigation) or (2)
from this time or after the Form III or Form IV was filed, whichever is later.
CONN. OFFICE OF LEGIS. RESEARCH, OLR BILL ANALYSIS: H.B. 6526 (2011), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011 /BA/201 HB-06526-RO10870-BA.htm.
133. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 6.
134. Id. § 1.
135. Id
136. Id § 8.
137. An Act Concerning Brownfield Remediation and Development as an Economic
Driver, 2011 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 11-141, § 15 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 10-135(e) (West 2011)).
138. Id § 15.
139. Id. § 16.
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program permits the Connecticut Development Authority to issue
bonds backed by incremental property tax revenue expected to be
generated by a redevelopment program that includes either
information technology programs in economically distressed
areas or for brownfield remediation.14 0
VI. CONCLUSION
The Brownfield Economic Driver Act, and particularly Section 17
of the Act, creates a new world of opportunity for the remediation,
redevelopment, and revitalization of Brownfield properties in
Connecticut. The Act moves the state to the forefront of those who have
recognized that achieving those objectives requires a realistic
reassessment of liability for site cleanup volunteers. As yet in its
infancy, complications and difficulties are likely to arise in its
administration and implementation.
140. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-23zz (West 2011).
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